The Pipeline Project:  Pre-publication Independent Replications of a Single Laboratory’s Research Pipeline by Sackett, Aaron M.
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota
UST Research Online
Marketing Faculty Publications Marketing
2016
The Pipeline Project: Pre-publication Independent
Replications of a Single Laboratory’s Research
Pipeline
Aaron M. Sackett
sackett@stthomas.edu, sackett@stthomas.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.stthomas.edu/ocbmktgpub
Part of the Marketing Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Marketing at UST Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marketing
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UST Research Online. For more information, please contact libroadmin@stthomas.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sackett, Aaron M., "The Pipeline Project: Pre-publication Independent Replications of a Single Laboratory’s Research Pipeline"
(2016). Marketing Faculty Publications. 47.
http://ir.stthomas.edu/ocbmktgpub/47
The pipeline project: Pre-publication independent replications of a single
laboratory's research pipeline
Martin Schweinsberg a,⁎, Nikhil Madan a, Michelangelo Vianello b, S. Amy Sommer c, Jennifer Jordan d,
Warren Tierney a, Eli Awtrey e, Luke Lei Zhu f, Daniel Diermeier g, Justin E. Heinze h, Malavika Srinivasan i,
David Tannenbaum g, Eliza Bivolaru a, Jason Dana j, Clintin P. Davis-Stober k, Christilene du Plessis l,
Quentin F. Gronau m, Andrew C. Hafenbrack n, Eko Yi Liao o, Alexander Ly m, Maarten Marsman m,
Toshio Murase p, Israr Qureshi q, Michael Schaerer a, Nico Thornley a, Christina M. Tworek r,
Eric-Jan Wagenmakers m, Lynn Wong a, Tabitha Anderson s, Christopher W. Bauman t, Wendy L. Bedwell u,
Victoria Brescoll j, Andrew Canavan s, Jesse J. Chandler v, Erik Cheries w, Sapna Cheryan e, Felix Cheung x,y,
Andrei Cimpian r, Mark A. Clark z, Diana Cordon s, Fiery Cushman i, Peter H. Ditto t, Thomas Donahue s,
Sarah E. Frick u, Monica Gamez-Djokic aa, Rebecca Hofstein Grady t, Jesse Graham ab, Jun Gu ac, Adam Hahn ad,
Brittany E. Hanson ae, Nicole J. Hartwich ad, Kristie Hein s, Yoel Inbar af, Lily Jiang e, Tehlyr Kellogg s,
Deanna M. Kennedy ag, Nicole Legate s, Timo P. Luoma ad, Heidi Maibuecher s, Peter Meindl ab, Jennifer Miles t,
Alexandra Mislin z, Daniel C. Molden aa, Matt Motyl ae, George Newman j, Hoai Huong Ngo ah,
Harvey Packham ai, Philip S. Ramsay u, Jennifer L. Ray aj, Aaron M. Sackett ak, Anne-Laure Sellier c,
Tatiana Sokolova c,al, Walter Sowden h, Daniel Storage r, Xiaomin Sun am, Jay J. Van Bavel aj,
Anthony N. Washburn ae, Cong Wei am, Erik Wetter an, Carlos T. Wilson s,
Sophie-Charlotte Darroux a, Eric Luis Uhlmann a,⁎
a INSEAD, France and Singapore
b University of Padova, Italy
c HEC Paris, France
d University of Groningen, The Netherlands
e University of Washington, United States
f University of Manitoba, Canada
g University of Chicago, United States
h University of Michigan, United States
i Harvard University, United States
j Yale University, United States
k University of Missouri, United States
l Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, The Netherlands
m University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
n Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Portugal
o Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau
p Roosevelt University, United States
q IE Business School, IE University, Spain
r University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States
s Illinois Institute of Technology, United States
t University of California, Irvine, United States
u University of South Florida, United States
v Mathematica Policy Research, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, United States
w University of Massachusetts Amherst, United States
x Michigan State University, United States
y University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
z American University, United States
aa Northwestern University, United States
ab University of Southern California, United States
ac Monash University, Australia
ad Social Cognition Center Cologne, University of Cologne, Germany
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 66 (2016) 55–67
⁎ Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses:martin.schweinsberg@insead.edu (M. Schweinsberg), eric.luis.uhlmann@gmail.com (E.L. Uhlmann).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.001
0022-1031/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate / j esp
ae University of Illinois at Chicago, United States
af University of Toronto, Canada
ag University of Washington Bothell, United States
ah Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, France
ai University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
aj New York University, United States
ak University of St. Thomas, United States
al University of Michigan, United States
am Beijing Normal University, China
an Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden
a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 31 October 2014
Revised 29 September 2015
Accepted 1 October 2015
Available online 24 March 2016
Keywords:
Crowdsourcing science
Replication
Reproducibility
Research transparency
Methodology
Meta-science
This crowdsourced project introduces a collaborative approach to improving the reproducibility of scientiﬁc
research, in which ﬁndings are replicated in qualiﬁed independent laboratories before (rather than after) they
are published. Our goal is to establish a non-adversarial replication process with highly informative ﬁnal results.
To illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) approach, 25 research groups conducted repli-
cations of all ten moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of
August 2014. Six ﬁndings replicated according to all replication criteria, one ﬁnding replicated but with a sig-
niﬁcantly smaller effect size than the original, one ﬁnding replicated consistently in the original culture but not
outside of it, and two ﬁndings failed to ﬁnd support. In total, 40% of the original ﬁndings failed at least one
major replication criterion. Potential ways to implement and incentivize pre-publication independent replication
on a large scale are discussed.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
The reproducibility of key ﬁndings distinguishes scientiﬁc studies
frommere anecdotes. However, for reasons that are not yet fully under-
stood, many, if not most, published studies across many scientiﬁc
domains are not easily replicated by independent laboratories (Begley
& Ellis, 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015;
Prinz, Schlange, & Asadullah, 2011). For example, an initiative by
Bayer Healthcare to replicate 67 pre-clinical studies led to a reproduc-
ibility rate of 20–25% (Prinz et al., 2011), and researchers at Amgen
were only able to replicate 6 of 53 inﬂuential cancer biology studies
(Begley & Ellis, 2012). More recently, across a number of crowdsourced
replication initiatives in social psychology, the majority of independent
replications failed to ﬁnd the signiﬁcant results obtained in the original
report (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science
Collaboration, 2015).
The process of replicating published work can be adversarial
(Bohannon, 2014; Gilbert, 2014; Kahneman, 2014; Schnall, 2014a/b/c;
but see Matzke et al., 2015), with concerns raised that some replicators
select ﬁndings from research areas in which they lack expertise and
about which they hold skeptical priors (Lieberman, 2014; Wilson,
2014). Some replications may have been conducted with insufﬁcient
pretesting and tailoring of study materials to the new subject popula-
tion, or involve sensitivemanipulations andmeasures that even experi-
enced investigators ﬁnd difﬁcult to properly carry out (Mitchell, 2014;
Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). On the other side of
the replication process, motivated reasoning (Ditto & Lopez, 1992;
Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Molden & Higgins, 2012)
and post-hoc dissonance (Festinger, 1957) may lead the original au-
thors to dismiss evidence they would have accepted as disconﬁrmatory
had it been available in the early stages of theoretical development
(Mahoney, 1977; Nickerson, 1999; Schaller, 2016; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1971).
We introduce a complementary andmore collaborative approach, in
which ﬁndings are replicated in qualiﬁed independent laboratories be-
fore (rather than after) they are published (see also Schooler, 2014).
We illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) ap-
proach through a crowdsourced project in which 25 laboratories from
around the world conducted replications of all 10 moral judgment ef-
fects which the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline”
as of August 2014.
Each of the 10 original studies from Uhlmann and collaborators ob-
tained support for at least one major theoretical prediction. The studies
used simple designs that called for ANOVA followed up by t-tests of
simple effects for the experiments, and correlational analyses for the
nonexperimental studies. Importantly, for all original studies, all condi-
tions and outcomes related to the theoretical hypotheses were included
in the analyses, and no participants were excluded. Furthermore, with
the exception of two studies that were run before 2010, results were
only analyzed after data collection had been terminated. In these two
older studies (intuitive economics effect and belief–act inconsistency
effect), data were analyzed twice, once approximately halfway through
data collection and then again after the termination of data collection.
Thus, for most of the studies, a lack of replicability cannot be easily
accounted for by exploitation of researcher degrees of freedom
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) in the original analyses. For
the purposes of transparency, the data and materials from both the
original and replication studies are posted on the Open Science Frame-
work (https://osf.io/q25xa/), creating a publicly available resource
researchers can use to better understand reproducibility and non-
reproducibility in science (Kitchin, 2014; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012;
Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012).
In addition, as replicator labswere explicitly selected for their exper-
tise and access to subject populations that were theoretically expected
to exhibit the original effects, several of the most commonly given
counter-explanations for failures to replicate are addressed by the
present project. Under these conditions, a failure to replicate is more
clearly attributable to the original study overestimating the relevant ef-
fect size— either due to the “winner's curse” suffered by underpowered
studies that achieve signiﬁcant results largely by chance (Button et al.,
2013; Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Schooler, 2011) or
due to unanticipated differences between participant populations,
which would suggest that the phenomenon is less general than initially
hypothesized (Schaller, 2016). Because one replication teamwas locat-
ed at the institution where four of the original studies were run (North-
western University), and replication laboratories are spread across six
countries (United States, Canada, The Netherlands, France, Germany,
and China) it is possible to empirically assess the extent to which de-
clines in effect sizes between original and replication studies
(Schooler, 2011) are due to unexpected yet potentially meaningful
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cultural and population differences (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010). For all of these reasons, this crowdsourced PPIR initiative
features replications arguably higher in informational value (Nelson,
2005; Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010) than in prior
work.
1. Method
1.1. Selection of original ﬁndings and replication laboratories
Ten moral judgment studies were selected for replication. We de-
ﬁned our sample of studies as all unpublished moral judgment effects
the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of August
2014. Thesemoral judgment studieswere ideal for a crowdsourced rep-
lication project because the study scenarios and dependent measures
were straightforward to administer, and did not involve sensitive
manipulations of participants' mindset or mood. They also examined
basic aspects of moral psychology such as character attributions, inter-
personal trust, and fairness that were not expected to vary dramatically
between the available samples of research participants. All 10 original
studies found support for at least one key theoretical prediction. The
crowdsourced PPIR project assessed whether support for the same pre-
diction was obtained by other research groups.
Unlike any previous large-scale replication project, all original ﬁnd-
ings targeted for replication in the Pipeline Project were unpublished
rather than published. In addition, all ﬁndings were volunteered by
the original authors, rather than selected by replicators from a set of
prestigious journals in a given year (e.g., Open Science Collaboration,
2015) or nominated on a public website (e.g., Ebersole et al., in press).
In a further departure fromprevious replication initiatives, participation
in the Pipeline Projectwas by invitation-only, via individual recruitment
e-mails. This ensured that participating laboratories had both adequate
expertise and access to a subject population in which the original
ﬁnding was theoretically expected to replicate using the original mate-
rials (i.e., without any need for further pre-testing or revisions to the
manipulations, scenarios, or dependent variables; Schwarz & Strack,
2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). Thus, the PPIR project did not repeat
the original studies in new locationswithout regard for context. Indeed,
replication labs and locations were selected a priori by the original
authors as appropriate to test the effect of interest.
1.2. Data collection process
Each independent laboratory conducted a direct replication of
between three and ten of the targeted studies (Mstudies = 5.64, SD =
1.24), using the materials developed by the original researchers. To re-
duce participant fatigue, studies were typically administered using a
computerized script in one of three packets, each containing three to
four studies, with study order counterbalanced between-subjects.
There were four noteworthy exceptions to this approach. First, the
Northwestern University replications were conducted using paper-
pencil questionnaires, andparticipantswere randomly assigned to com-
plete a packet including either one longer study or three shorter studies
in a ﬁxed rather than counterbalanced order. Second, the Yale Universi-
ty replications omitted one study from one packet out of investigator
concerns that the participant populationmightﬁnd themoral judgment
scenario offensive. Third, the INSEAD Paris lab data collections included
a translation error in one study that required it to be re-run separately
from the others. Fourth and ﬁnally, the HEC Paris replication pack in-
cluded six studies in a ﬁxed order. Tables S1a–S1f in Supplement 1 sum-
marize the replication locations, speciﬁc studies replicated, sample
sizes, mode of study administration (online vs. laboratory), and type
of subject population (general population, MBA students, graduate
students, or undergraduate students) for each replication packet.
Replication packets were translated from English into the local
language (e.g., Chinese, French) with the exception of the HEC Paris
and Groningen data collections, where the materials were in English,
as participants were enrolled in classes delivered in English. All transla-
tions were checked for accuracy by at least two native language
speakers. The complete Qualtrics links for the replication packets are
available at https://osf.io/q25xa/.
Weused a similar data collection process to theMany Labs initiatives
(Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014). The studies were pro-
grammed and carefully error-checked by the project coordinators,
who then distributed individual links to each replication team. Each
participant's data was sent to a centralized Qualtrics account as they
completed the study. After the data were collected, the ﬁles were com-
piled by the project's ﬁrst and second author and uploaded to the Open
Science Framework. We could not have replication teams upload their
data directly to the OSF because it had to be carefully anonymized
ﬁrst. The Pipeline Project website on the OSF includes three master
ﬁles, one for each pipeline packet, with the data from all the replication
studies together. The data for the original studies is likewise posted, also
in an anonymized format.
Replication teams were asked to collect 100 participants ormore for
at least one packet of replication studies. Although some of the individ-
ual replication studies had less than 80% power to detect an effect of the
same size as the original study, aggregating samples across locations of
our studies fulﬁlled Simonsohn's (2015) suggestion that replications
should have at least 2.5 times as many participants as the original
study. The largest-N original study collected data for 265 subjects; the
aggregated replication samples for each ﬁnding range from 1542 partic-
ipants to 3647 participants. Thus, the crowdsourced project allowed for
high-powered tests of the original hypotheses andmore accurate effect
size estimates than the original data collections.
1.3. Speciﬁc ﬁndings targeted for replication
Although the principal goal of the present article is to introduce the
PPIR method and demonstrate its feasibility and effectiveness, each of
the ten original effects targeted for replication are of theoretical interest
in-and-of themselves. Detailedwrite-ups of themethods and results for
each original study are provided in Supplement 2, and the complete
replication materials are included in Supplement 3.
The bulk of the studies test core predictions of the person-
centered account of moral judgment (Landy & Uhlmann, 2015;
Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Uhlmann,
2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Two further studies
explore the effects of moral concerns on perceptions of economic pro-
cesses, with an eye toward better understanding public opposition to
aspects of the free market system (Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2001,
2002). A ﬁnal pair of studies examines the implications of the psychol-
ogy of moral judgment for corporate reputation management
(Diermeier, 2011).
1.3.1. Person-centered morality
The person-centered account of moral judgment posits that moral
evaluations are frequently driven by informational value regarding
personal character rather than the harmfulness and blameworthiness
of acts. As a result, less harmful acts can elicitmore negativemoral judg-
ments, as long as they are more informative about personal character.
Further, act-person dissociations can emerge, in which acts that are
rated as less blameworthy than other acts nonetheless send clearer
signals of poor character (Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011;
Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). More broadly, the person-
centered approach is consistent with research showing that internal
factors, such as intentions, can be weighed more heavily in moral judg-
ments than objective external consequences. The ﬁrst six studies
targeted for replication in the Pipeline Project test ideas at the heart of
the theory, and further represent much of the unpublished work from
this research program. Large-sample failures to replicate many or
most of these ﬁndings across 25 universities would at a minimum
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severely undermine the theory, and perhaps even invalidate it entirely.
Brief descriptions of each of the person-centered morality studies are
provided below.
Study 1: Bigot–misanthrope effect. Participants judge a manager who
selectively mistreats racial minorities as a more blameworthy person
than a manager who mistreats all of his employees. This supports the
hypothesis that the informational value regarding character provided
by patterns of behavior plays amore important role inmoral judgments
than aggregating harmful vs. helpful acts (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011;
Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & Ende, 1996).
Study 2: Cold-hearted prosociality effect. A medical researcher who
does experiments on animals is seen as engaging in more morally
praiseworthy acts than a pet groomer, but also as a worse person. This
effect emerges even in joint evaluation (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, &
Bazerman, 1999), with the two targets evaluated at the same time.
Such act-person dissociations demonstrate that moral evaluations of
acts and the agents who carry them out can diverge in systematic and
predictable ways. They represent the most unique prediction of, and
therefore strongest evidence for, the person centered approach to
moral judgment.
Study 3: Bad tipper effect. A person who leaves the full tip entirely in
pennies is judgedmore negatively than a personwho leaves lessmoney
in bills, and tipping in pennies is seen as higher in informational value
regarding character. Like the bigot-misanthrope effect described
above, this provides rare direct evidence of the role of perceived infor-
mational value regarding character inmoral judgments.Moral reactions
often track perceived character deﬁcits rather than harmful conse-
quences (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Yuill et al., 1996).
Study 4: Belief–act inconsistency effect. An animal rights activist who
is caught hunting is seen as an untrustworthy and bad person, even by
participants who think hunting is morally acceptable. This reﬂects per-
son centered morality: an act seen as morally permissible in-and-of-
itself nonetheless provokes moral opprobrium due to its inconsistency
with the agent's stated beliefs (Monin & Merritt, 2012; Valdesolo &
DeSteno, 2007).
Study 5: Moral inversion effect. A company that contributes to charity
but then spends even more money promoting the contribution in ad-
vertisements not only nulliﬁes its generous deed, but is perceived
even more negatively than a company that makes no donation at all.
Thus, even an objectively helpful act can provoke moral condemnation,
so long as it suggests negative underlying traits such as insincerity
(Jordan, Diermeier, & Galinsky, 2012).
Study 6: Moral cliff effect. A company that airbrushes the model in
their skin cream advertisement to make her skin look perfect is seen
as more dishonest, ill-intentioned, and deserving of punishment than
a company that hires a model whose skin already looks perfect. This
theoretically reﬂects inferences about underlying intentions and traits
(Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Yuill et al., 1996). In the two cases con-
sumers have been equally misled by a perfect-looking model, but in
the airbrushing case the deception seemsmore deliberate and explicitly
dishonest.
1.3.2. Morality and markets
Studies 7 and 8 examined the role of moral considerations in lay
perceptions of capitalism and businesspeople, in an effort to better
understand discrepancies between the policy prescriptions of econo-
mists and everyday people (Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2001, 2002).
Despite the material wealth created by free markets, moral intuitions
lead to deep psychological unease with the inequality and incentive
structures of capitalism. Understanding such intuitions is critical to
bridging the gap between lay and scientiﬁc understandings of economic
processes.
Study 7: Intuitive economics effect. Economic variables that arewidely
regarded as unfair are perceived as especially bad for the economy. Such
a correlation raises the possibility that moral concerns about fairness
irrationally inﬂuence perceptions of economic processes. In other
words, aspects of free markets that seem unfair on moral grounds
(e.g., replacing hard-working factory workers with automated machin-
ery that can do the job more cheaply) may be subject to distorted per-
ceptions of their objective economic effects (a moral coherence effect;
Clark, Chen, & Ditto, in press; Liu & Ditto, 2013).
Study 8: Burn-in-hell effect. Participants perceive corporate execu-
tives as more likely to burn in hell than members of social categories
deﬁned by antisocial behavior, such as vandals. This of course reﬂects
incredibly negative assumptions about senior business leaders.
“Vandals” is a social category deﬁned by bad behavior; “corporate exec-
utive” is simply an organizational role. However, the assumed behaviors
of a corporate executive appear negative enough to warrant moral
censure.
1.3.3. Reputation management
The ﬁnal two studies examined how prior assumptions and beliefs
can shape moral judgments of organizations faced with a reputational
crisis. Corporate leaders may frequently fail to anticipate the negative
assumptions everyday people have about businesses, or the types of
moral standards that are applied to different types of organizations.
These issues hold important applied implications, given the often
devastating economic consequences of psychologically misinformed
reputation management (Diermeier, 2011).
Study 9: Presumption of guilt effect. For a company, failing to respond
to accusations of misconduct leads to similar judgments as being inves-
tigated and found guilty. If companies accused of wrongdoing are
simply assumed to be guilty until proven otherwise, this means that
aggressive reputation management during a corporate crisis is impera-
tive. Inaction or “no comment” responses to public accusations may be
in effect an admission of guilt (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Pace, Fediuk, &
Botero, 2010).
Study 10: Higher standard effect. It is perceived as acceptable for a pri-
vate company to give small (but not large) perks to its top executive. But
for the leader of a charitable organization, even a small perk is seen as
moral transgression. Thus, under some conditions a praiseworthy repu-
tation and laudable goals can actually hurt an organization, by leading it
to be held to a higher moral standard.
The original data collections found empirical support for each of the
ten effects described above. These studies possessed many of the same
strengths andweaknesses found in the typical published research in so-
cial psychology journals. On the positive side, the original studies fea-
tured hypotheses strongly grounded in prior theory, and research
designs that allowed for excellent experimental control (and for the ex-
perimental designs, causal inferences). On the negative side, the original
studies had only modest sample sizes and relied on participants from
one subpopulation of a single country. The Pipeline Project assessed
how many of these ﬁndings would emerge as robust in large-sample
crowdsourced replications at universities across the world.
1.4. Pre-registered analysis plan
The pre-registration documents for our analyses are posted on the
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/uivsj/), and are also included
in Supplement 4. The HEC Paris replications were conducted prior to
the pre-registration of the analyses for the project; all of the other rep-
lications can be considered pre-registered (Wagenmakers, Wetzels,
Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012). None of the original studies
were pre-registered.
Pre-registration is a new method in social psychology (Nosek &
Lakens, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2012), and there is currently no
ﬁxed standard of practice. It is generally acknowledged that, when fea-
sible, registering a plan for how the data will be analyzed in advance is a
good research practice that increases conﬁdence in the reported ﬁnd-
ings. As with prior crowdsourced replication projects (Ebersole et al.,
in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), the
present report focuses on the primary effect of interest from each
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original study. Our pre-registration documents therefore list 1) the rep-
lication criteria that will be applied to the original ﬁndings and 2) the
speciﬁc comparisons used to calculate the replication effect sizes
(i.e., for each study, which condition will be compared to which condi-
tion and what the key dependent measure is). This method provides
few researcher degrees of freedom (Simmons et al., 2011) to exaggerate
the replicability of the original ﬁndings.
2. Results
2.1. Data exclusion policy
None of the original studies targeted for replication dropped obser-
vations, and to be consistent none of the replication studies did either.
It is true in principle that excluding data is sometimes justiﬁed and
can lead to more accurate inferences (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances,
2016; Curran, 2016). However, in practice this is often done in the
post-hoc manner and exploits researcher degrees of freedom to produce
false positive ﬁndings (Simmons et al., 2011). Excluding observations is
most justiﬁed in the case of research highly subject to noisy data, such
as research on reaction times for instance (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji,
2003). The present studies almost exclusively used simple moral judg-
ment scenarios and self-report Likert-type scale responses for dependent
measures. Our policy was therefore to not remove any participants from
the analyses of the replication results, and dropping observations was
not part of the pre-registered analysis plan for the project. The data
from the Pipeline Project is publicly posted on the Open Science Frame-
workwebsite, and anyone interested can re-analyze the data using partic-
ipant exclusions if they wish to do so.
2.2. Original and replication effect sizes
The original effect sizes, meta-analyzed replication effect sizes,
and effect sizes for each individual replication are shown in Fig. 1.
To obtain the displayed effect sizes, a standardized mean difference
(d, Cohen, 1988) was computed for each study and each sample tak-
ing the difference between the means of the two sets of scores and
dividing it by the sample standard deviation (for uncorrelated
means) or by the standard deviation of the difference scores (for
dependent means). Effect sizes for each study were then combined
according to a random effects model, weighting every single effect
for the inverse of its total variance (i.e. the sum of the between-
and within-study variances) (Cochran & Carroll, 1953; Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001). The variances of the combined effects were computed
as the reciprocal of the sum of the weights and the standard error of
the combined effect sizes as the squared root of the variance, and 95%
conﬁdence intervals were computed by adding to and subtracting
from the combined effect 1.96 standard errors. Formulas for the
calculation of meta-analytic means, variances, SEs, and CIs were
taken from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein (2011) and
from Cooper and Hedges (1994).
In Fig. 1 and in the present report more generally our focus is on the
replicability of the single most theoretically important result from each
original study (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). However, Supplement 2 more comprehensively
repeats the analyses from each original study, with the replication
results appearing in brackets in red font immediately after the same sta-
tistical test from the original investigation.
2.3. Applying frequentist replication criteria
There is currently no single, ﬁxed standard to evaluate replica-
tion results, and as outlined in our pre-registration plan we therefore
applied ﬁve primary criteria to determine whether the replications
successfully reproduced the original ﬁndings (Brandt et al., 2014;
Simonsohn, 2015). These included whether 1) the original and replica-
tion effects were in the same direction, 2) the replication effect was
statistically signiﬁcant after meta-analyzing across all replications,
3) meta-analyzing the original and replication effects resulted in a
signiﬁcant effect, 4) the original effect was inside the conﬁdence interval
of the meta-analyzed replication effect size, and 5) the replication effect
size was large enough to have been reliably detected in the original
study (“small telescopes” criterion; Simonsohn, 2015). Table 1 eval-
uates the replication results for each study along the ﬁve dimensions,
as well as providing a more holistic evaluation in the ﬁnal column.
The small telescopes criterion perhaps requires some further expla-
nation. A large-N replication can yield an effect size signiﬁcantly
different from zero that still fails the small telescopes criterion, in that
the “true” (i.e., replication) effect is too small to have been reliably
detected in the original study. This suggests that although the results
of the original study could just have been due to statistical noise, the
original authors did correctly predict the direction of the true effect
from their theoretical reasoning (see also Hales, 2016). Figure S5 in Sup-
plement 5 summarizes the small telescopes results, including each orig-
inal effect size, the corresponding aggregated replication effect size, and
Fig. 1. Original effect sizes (indicated with an X), individual effect sizes for each replication sample (small circles), and meta-analyzed replication effect sizes (large circles). Error bars
reﬂect the 95% conﬁdence interval around themeta-analyzed replication effect size. Note the “Higher Standard” study featured two effects, one of which was originally signiﬁcant (effect
of awarding a small perk to the head of a charity) and one ofwhichwas originally a null effect (effect of awarding a small perk to a corporate executive). Note also that the Presumption of
Guilt effect was a null ﬁnding in the original study (no difference between failure to respond to accusations of wrongdoing and being found guilty).
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Table 1
Assessment of replication results.
Effect Description of original ﬁnding Original and
replication
effect in same
direction
Replication
effect
signiﬁcant
Effect signiﬁcant
meta-analyzing the
replications and the
original study
Original effect inside
CI of replication
Small
telescopes
criterion
passed
Overall assessment of replicability
Moral inversion A company that contributes to charity but then
spends even more money promoting the
contribution is perceived more negatively than a
company that makes no donation at all.
Yes Yes Yes No (rep. b original) Yes Successful replication overall. The effect in the replication is smaller
than in the original study, but it passes the small telescopes criterion.
Bad tipper A person who leaves the full tip entirely in pennies is
judged more negatively than a person who leaves
less money in bills.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Replicated robustly in USA with variable results outside the USA.
Belief–act
inconsistency
An animal rights activist who is caught hunting is
seen as more immoral than a big game hunter.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Successful replication
Moral cliff A company that airbrushes their model to make her
skin look perfect is seen as more dishonest than a
company that hires a model whose skin already
looks perfect.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Successful replication
Cold hearted
prosociality
A medical researcher who does experiments on
animals is seen as engaging in more morally
praiseworthy acts than a pet groomer, but also as a
worse person
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Successful replication
Burn in hell Corporate executives are seen as more likely to burn
in hell than vandals.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Successful replication
Bigot-misanthrope Participants judge a manager who selectively
mistreats racial minorities as a more blameworthy
person than a manager who mistreats everyone.
Yes Yes Yes No (rep. N original) Yes Successful replication
Presumption of
guilt
For a company, failing to respond to accusations of
misconduct leads to judgments as harsh as being
found guilty.
Yes Yes
(original
was a null
effect)
Yes (original was a
null effect)
No (rep. N original) N/A Failure to replicate. Original effect was a null effect with a tiny point
difference, such that failing to respond to accusations of wrongdoing is
just as bad as being investigated and found guilty. However in the
replication failing to respond is unexpectedly signiﬁcantly worse than
being found guilty, with an effect size over ﬁve times as large as in the
original study. This cannot be explained by a presumption of guilt as in
the original theory.
Intuitive
economics
The extent to which people think high taxes are fair
is positively correlated with the extent to which they
think high taxes are good for the economy.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Successful replication
Higher standards:
company
condition
It is perceived as acceptable for the top executive at a
corporation to receive a small perk.
Yes Yes
(original
was a null
effect)
Yes (original was a
null effect)
No (rep. N original) N/A Failure to replicate. The original study found that a small executive
perk hurt the reputation of the head of a charity (signiﬁcant effect) but
not a company (null effect). In the replication a small perk hurt both
types of executives to an equal degree. The effect of a small perk in the
company condition is over two times as large in the replication as in
the original study. There is no evidence in the replication that the head
of a charity is held to a higher standard.
Higher standards:
charity
condition
For the leader of a charitable organization, receiving
a small perk is seen as moral transgression.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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d33% line indicating the smallest effect size that would be reasonably
detectable with the original study design.
Interpreting the replication results is slightly more complicated for
the two original ﬁndings which involved null effects (presumption of
guilt effect and higher standard effect). The original presumption of
guilt study found that failing to respond to accusations of wrongdoing
is perceived equally negatively as being investigated and found guilty.
The original higher standard study predicted and found that receiving
a small perk (as opposed to purely monetary compensation) negatively
affected the reputation of the head of a charity (signiﬁcant effect), but
not a corporate executive (null effect), consistent with the idea that
charitable organizations are held to a higher standard than for-proﬁt
companies. For these two studies, a failure to replicate would involve
a signiﬁcant effect emerging where there had not been one before, or
a replication effect size signiﬁcantly larger than the original null effect.
The more holistic evaluation of replicability in the ﬁnal column of
Table 1 takes these nuances into account.
Meta-analyzed replication effects for all studies were in the same di-
rection as the original effect (see Table 1). In eight out of ten studies, ef-
fects that were signiﬁcant or nonsigniﬁcant in the original study were
likewise signiﬁcant or nonsigniﬁcant in the crowdsourced replication
(eight of eight effects that were signiﬁcant in the original study were
also signiﬁcant in the replication; neither of the two original ﬁndings
that were null effects in the original study were also null effects in the
replication). Including the original effect size in the meta-analysis did
not change these results, due to the much larger total sample of the
crowdsourced replications. For four out of ten studies, the conﬁdence in-
terval of the meta-analyzed replication effect did not include the original
effect; in one case, this occurred because the replication effectwas smaller
than the original effect. No study failed the small telescopes criterion.
2.4. Applying a Bayesian replication criterion
Replication results can also be evaluated using Bayesian methods
(e.g., Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014; Wagenmakers, Verhagen & Ly,
in press). Here we focus on the Bayes factor, a continuous measure of
evidence that quantiﬁes the degree to which the observed data are pre-
dicted better by the alternative hypothesis than by the null hypothesis
(e.g., Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, Grünwald, & Steyvers, 2006).
The Bayes factor requires that the alternative hypothesis is able to
make predictions, and this necessitates that its parameters are assigned
speciﬁc values. In the Bayesian framework, the uncertainty associated
with these values is described through a prior probability distribution.
For instance, the default correlation test features an alternative hypoth-
esis that stipulates all values of the population correlation coefﬁcient to
be equally likely a priori— this is instantiated by a uniform prior distri-
bution that ranges from −1 to 1 (Jeffreys, 1961; Ly, Verhagen &
Wagenmakers, in press). Another example is the default t-test, which
features an alternative hypothesis that assigns a fat-tailed prior distribu-
tion to effect size (i.e., a Cauchy distribution with scale r = 1; for details
see Jeffreys, 1961; Ly et al., in press; Rouder et al., 2009).
In a ﬁrst analysis, we applied the default Bayes factor hypothesis tests
to the original ﬁndings. The results are shown on the y-axis of Fig. 2. For
instance, the original experiment on the moral inversion effect yielded
BF10 = 7.526, meaning that the original data are about 7.5 times more
likely under the default alternative hypothesis than under the null hy-
pothesis. For 9 out of 11 effects, BF10 N 1, indicating evidence in favor of
the default alternative hypothesis. This evidencewas particularly compel-
ling for the following ﬁve effects: the moral cliff effect, the cold hearted
prosociality effect, the bigot–misanthrope effect, the intuitive economics ef-
fect, and – albeit to a lesser degree– the higher standards-charity effect.
The evidence was less conclusive for the moral inversion effect, the bad
tipper effect, and the burn in hell effect; for the belief-act inconsistency effect,
the evidence is almost perfectly ambiguous (i.e., BF10 = 1.119). In con-
trast, and as predicted by the theory, the Bayes factor indicates support
in favor of the null hypothesis for the presumption of guilt effect
(i.e., BF01 = 5.604; note the switch in subscripts: the data are about 5.6
times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative
hypothesis). Finally, for the higher standards-company effect the Bayes fac-
tor does signal support in favor of the null hypothesis – as predicted by
the theory – but only by a narrow margin (i.e., BF01 = 1.781).
In a second analysis, we take advantage of the fact that Bayesian in-
ference is, at its core, a theory of optimal learning. Speciﬁcally, in order
to gauge replication success we calculate Bayes factors separately for
each replication study; however, we now depart from the default spec-
iﬁcation of the alternative hypothesis and instead use a highly informed
prior distribution, namely the posterior distribution from the original
experiment. This informed alternative hypothesis captures the belief
of a rational agent who has seen the original experiment and believes
the alternative hypothesis to be true. In other words, our replication
Bayes factors contrast the predictive adequacy of two hypotheses:
the standard null hypothesis that corresponds to the belief of a skeptic
and an informed alternative hypothesis that corresponds to the
idealized belief of a proponent (Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014;
Wagenmakers et al., in press).
The replication Bayes factors are denoted by BFr0 and are displayed
by the gray dots in Fig. 2. Most informed alternative hypotheses re-
ceived overwhelming support, as indicated by very high values of BFr0.
From a Bayesian perspective, the original effects therefore generally
replicated with a few exceptions. First, the replication Bayes factors
favor the informed alternative hypothesis for the higher standards-
company effect, when the original was a null ﬁnding. Second, the
evidence is neither conclusively for nor against the presumption of
guilt effect, which was also originally a null ﬁnding. The data and output
for the Bayesian assessments of the original and replication results are
available on the Pipeline Project's OSF page: https://osf.io/q25xa/.
2.5. Moderator analyses
Table 2 summarizeswhether a number of sample characteristics and
methodological variables signiﬁcantly moderated the replication effect
sizes for each original ﬁnding targeted for replication. Supplement 6
provides more details on our moderator analyses.
2.5.1. USA vs. non-USA sample
As noted earlier, no cultural differences for any of the original ﬁnd-
ings were hypothesized a priori. In fact replication laboratories were
chosen for the PPIR initiative due to their access to subject populations
inwhich the original effectwas theoretically predicted to emerge. How-
ever, it is, of course, an empirical question whether the effects vary
across cultures or not. Since all of the original studies were conducted
in the United States, we examined whether replication location (USA
vs. non-USA)made a difference. As seen in Table 2, six out of ten original
ﬁndings exhibited signiﬁcantly larger effect sizes in replications in the
United States, whereas the reverse was true for one original effect.
Results for one original ﬁnding, the bad tipper effect, were especially
variable across cultures (Q(16) = 165.39, p b .001). The percentage of
variability between studies that is due to heterogeneity rather than
chance (random sampling) is I2 = 90.32% in the bad tipper effect and
68.11% on average in all other effects studied. The bad tipper effect is
the only study in which non-US samples account for approximately a
half of the total true heterogeneity. The drop in I2 that we observed
when we removed non-USA samples from the other studies was
10.78% on average. The bad tipper effect replicated consistently in the
United States (dusa = 0.74, 95% CI [.62, .87]), but less so outside the
USA (dnon-USA = 0.30, 95% CI [−.22, .82])1; the difference between
these two effect sizes was signiﬁcant, F(1, 3635) = 52.59, p= .01. The
1 In a ﬁxed-effects model – i.e. without accounting for between study variability in the
computation of the standard error – the bad tipper effect is signiﬁcantly different from ze-
ro in non-USA samples as well.
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bad tipper effect actually signiﬁcantly reversed in the replication from
The Netherlands (dnetherlands = −0.46, p b .01). Although post hoc,
one potential explanation could be cultural differences in tipping
norms (Azar, 2007). Regardless of the underlying reasons, these analy-
ses provide initial evidence of cultural variability in the replication
results.
2.5.2. Same vs. different location as original study
To our knowledge, the Pipeline Project is the only crowdsourced
replication initiative to systematically re-run all of the targeted studies
using the original subject population. For instance, four studies conduct-
ed between 2007 and 2010 using Northwestern undergraduates as par-
ticipants were replicated in 2015 as part of the project, again using
Northwestern undergraduates. We reran our analyses of key effects
and included study location as a moderating variable (different location
as original study= coded as 0; same location as original study= coded
as 1). This allowed us to examine whether ﬁndings were more likely to
replicate in the original population than in new populations. As seen in
Table 2, four effectswere signiﬁcantly larger in the original location, two
effects were actually signiﬁcantly larger in locations other than the orig-
inal study site, and for ﬁve effects same versus different locationwas not
a signiﬁcant moderator.
2.5.3. Student sample vs. general population
The type of subject population was likewise examined. A general
criticism of psychological research is its over-reliance on undergraduate
student samples, arguably limiting the generalizability of research ﬁnd-
ings (Sears, 1986). As seen in Table 2, ﬁve effects were larger in the gen-
eral population than in student samples, whereas the reverse was true
for one effect.
2.5.4. Study order
As subject fatigue may create noise and reduce estimated effect
sizes, we examined whether the order in which the study appeared
made a difference. It seemed likely that studies would be more likely
to replicate when administered earlier in the replication packet.
Table 2
Moderators of replication results.
Effect US vs. non-US sample Study order General population vs. students Original location vs. different location
Moral inversion Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Orig N Diff
Bad tipper Signiﬁcant: US N non-US Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Gen pop N students Signiﬁcant: Orig N Diff
Belief–act inconsistency Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Late N Early Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Moral cliff Signiﬁcant: US N non-US Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Gen pop N Students Signiﬁcant: Orig N Diff
Cold hearted prosociality Signiﬁcant: US N non-US Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Gen pop N Students Not signiﬁcant
Burn in hell Signiﬁcant: US N non-US Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Gen pop N Students Signiﬁcant: Orig b Diff
Bigot-misanthrope Signiﬁcant: US b non-US Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Gen pop b Students Signiﬁcant: Orig b Diff
Presumption of guilt Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Intuitive economics Signiﬁcant: US N non-US Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Gen pop N Students Not signiﬁcant
Higher standards: company Signiﬁcant: US N non-US Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant: Orig N Diff
Higher standards: charity Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Fig. 2.Bayesian inference for the PipelineProject effects. The y-axis lists each effect and theBayes factor in favor of or against the default alternative hypothesis for thedata from the original
study (i.e., BF10 and BF01, respectively). The x-axis shows the values for the replication Bayes factor where prior distribution under the alternative hypothesis equals the posterior
distribution from the original study (i.e., BFr0). For most effects, the replication Bayes factors indicate overwhelming evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis; hence, the bottom
panel provides an enlarged view of a restricted scale. See text for details.
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However, order only signiﬁcantly moderated replication effect sizes for
one ﬁnding, which was unexpectedly larger when included later in the
replication packet.
2.6. Holistic assessment of replication results
Given the complexity of replication results and the plethora
of criteria with which to evaluate them (see Brandt et al., 2014;
Simonsohn, 2015), we close with a holistic assessment of the results
of this ﬁrst Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) initiative
(see also the ﬁnal column of Table 1).
Six out of ten of the original ﬁndings replicated quite robustly across
laboratories: the bigot–misanthrope effect, belief–act inconsistency effect,
cold-hearted prosociality,moral cliff effect, burn in hell effect, and intuitive
economics effect. For these original ﬁndings the aggregated replication
effect size was 1) in the same direction as in the original study, 2) statis-
tically signiﬁcant after meta-analyzing across all replications, 3) signiﬁ-
cant after meta-analyzing across both the original and replication effect
sizes, 4) not signiﬁcantly different from the original effect size, and
5) large enough to have been reliably detected in the original study
(“small telescopes” criterion; Simonsohn, 2015).
The bad tipper effect likewise replicated according to the above
criteria, but with some evidence of moderation by national culture. Ac-
cording to the frequentist criteria of statistical signiﬁcance, the effect
replicated consistently in the United States, but not in international
samples. This could be due to cultural differences in norms related to
tipping. It is noteworthy however that in the Bayesian analyses, almost
all replication Bayes factors favor the original hypothesis, suggesting
there is a true effect.
Themoral inversion effect is another interesting case. This effect was
statistically signiﬁcant in both the original and replication studies. How-
ever, the replication effect was smaller and with a conﬁdence interval
that did not include the original effect size, suggesting the original
study overestimated the true effect. Yet despite this, themoral inversion
effect passed the small telescopes criterion (Simonsohn, 2015): the ag-
gregated replication effect was large enough to have been reliably de-
tected in the original study. The original study therefore provided
evidence for the hypothesis that was unlikely to be mere statistical
noise. Overall, we consider the moral inversion effect supported by
the crowdsourced replication initiative.
In contrast, two ﬁndings failed to consistently replicate the same
pattern of results found in the original study (higher standards and
presumption of guilt). We consider the original theoretical predictions
not supported by the large-scale PPIR project. These studies were re-
run in qualiﬁed labs using subject populations predicted a priori by
the original authors to exhibit the hypothesized effects, and failed to
replicate in high-powered research designs that allowed for much
more accurate effect size estimates than in the original studies. Notably,
both of these original studies found null effects; the crowdsourced rep-
lications revealed true effect sizes that were both signiﬁcantly different
fromzero and two toﬁve times larger than in the original investigations.
Replication Bayes factors for the higher standards effect suggest the
original ﬁnding is simply not true, whereas results for the presumption
of guilt hypothesis are ambiguous, suggesting the evidence is not com-
pelling either way.
As noted earlier, the original effects examined in the Pipeline Project
fell into three broad categories: person-centered morality, moral per-
ceptions of market factors, and the psychology of corporate reputation.
These three broad categories of effects received differential support
from the results of the crowdsourced replication initiative. Robust sup-
port for predictions based on the person-centered account of moral
judgment (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Uhlmann et al., 2015) was ob-
tained across six original ﬁndings. The replication results also supported
predictions regardingmoral coherence (Liu & Ditto, 2013; Clark et al., in
press) in perceptions of economic variables, but did not ﬁnd consistent
support for two speciﬁc hypotheses concerning moral judgments of
organizations. Thus, the PPIR process allowed categories of robust ef-
fects to be separated from categories of ﬁndings that were less robust.
Although speculative, it may be the case that programmatic research
supported by many conceptual replications is more likely to directly
replicate than stand-alone ﬁndings (Schaller, 2016).
3. Discussion
The present crowdsourced project introduces Pre-Publication Inde-
pendent Replication (PPIR), a method for improving the reproducibility
of scientiﬁc research in which ﬁndings are replicated in qualiﬁed inde-
pendent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published.
PPIRs are high in informational value (Nelson, 2005; Nelson et al.,
2010) because replication labs are chosen by the original author based
on their expertise and access to relevant subject populations. Thus, com-
mon alternative explanations for failures to replicate are eliminated,
and the replication results are especially diagnostic of the validity of
the original claims.
The Pre-Publication Independent Replication approach is a practical
method to improve the rigor and replicability of the published literature
that complements the currently prevalent approach of replicating ﬁnd-
ings after the original work has been already published (Ebersole et al.,
in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The PPIR
method increases transparency and ensures that what appears in our
journals has already been independently validated. PPIR avoids the
cluttering of journal archives by original articles and replication reports
that are separated in time, and even publication outlets, without any
formal links to one another. It also avoids the adversarial interactions
that sometimes occur between original authors and replicators
(see Bohannon, 2014; Kahneman, 2014; Lieberman, 2014; Schnall,
2014a/b/c; Wilson, 2014). In sum, the PPIR approach represents a pow-
erful example of how to conduct a reliable and effective science that fos-
ters capitalization rather than self-correction.
To illustrate the PPIR approach, 25 research groups conducted repli-
cations of all moral judgment effects which the last author and his
collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of August 2014. Six of the ten orig-
inal ﬁndings replicated robustly across laboratories. At the same time,
four of the original ﬁndings failed at least one important replication cri-
terion (Brandt et al., 2014; Schaller, 2016; Verhagen & Wagenmakers,
2014)— either because the effect only replicated signiﬁcantly in the
original culture (one study), because the replication effect was signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than in the original (one study), because the original
ﬁnding consistently failed to replicate according to frequentist criteria
(two studies), or because the replication Bayes factor disfavored the
original ﬁnding (one study) or revealed mixed results (one study).
3.1. Moderate replication rates should be expected
The overall replication rate in the Pipeline Projectwas higher than in
the Reproducibility Project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), in
which 36% of 100 original studies were successfully replicated at the
p b .05 level. (Notably, 47% of the original effect sizes fell within the
95% conﬁdence interval of the replication effect size). However, the
two crowdsourced replication projects are not directly comparable,
since the Reproducibility Project featured single-shot replications from
individual laboratories and the Pipeline Project pooled the results of
multiple labs, leading to greater statistical power to detect small effects.
As seen in Fig. 1, the individual labs in the Pipeline Project often failed to
replicate original ﬁndings that proved reliable when the results of mul-
tiple replication sites were combined. In addition, the moral judgment
ﬁndings in the Pipeline Project required less expertise to carry out
than some of the original ﬁndings featured in the Reproducibility Pro-
ject, which likely also improved our replication rate.
A more relevant comparison is the Many Labs projects, which
pioneered the use of multiple laboratories to replicate the same ﬁnd-
ings. Our replication rate of 60%–80% was comparable to the Many
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Labs 1 project, in which eleven out of thirteen effects replicated across
36 laboratories (Klein et al., 2014). However it was higher than in
Many Labs 3, in which only 30% of ten original studies replicated across
20 laboratories (Ebersole et al., in press). Importantly, both original
studies from our Pipeline Project that failed to replicate (higher standard
and presumption of guilt), as well as the studies which replicated with
highly variable results across cultures (bad tipper) or obtained a smaller
replication effect size than the original (moral inversion) featured open
data and materials. They also featured no use of questionable research
practices such as optional stopping, failing to report all dependentmea-
sures, or removal of subjects, conditions, and outliers (Simmons et al.,
2011). This underscores the fact that studies will often fail to replicate
for reasons having nothing to do with scientiﬁc fraud or questionable
research practices.
It is important to remember that null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing
establishes a relatively low threshold of evidence. Thus, many effects
that were supported in the original study should not ﬁnd statistical sup-
port in replication studies (Stanley & Spence, 2014), especially if the
original study was underpowered (Cumming, 2008; Davis-Stober &
Dana, 2014; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013) and the replication
relied on participants from a different culture or demographic group
who may have interpreted the materials differently (Fabrigar &
Wegener, 2015; Stroebe, 2016). In the present crowdsourced PPIR in-
vestigation, the replication rate was imperfect despite original studies
that were conducted transparently and re-examined by qualiﬁed
replicators. It may be expecting too much for an effect obtained in one
laboratory and subject population to automatically replicate in any
other laboratory and subject population.
Increasing sample sizes dramatically (for instance, to 200 subjects
per cell) reduces both Type 1 and Type 2 errors by increasing statistical
power, but may not be logistically or economically feasible for many re-
search laboratories (Schaller, 2016). Researchers could instead run ini-
tial studies with moderate sample sizes (for instance, 50 subjects per
condition in the case of an experimental study; Simmons et al., 2013),
conduct similarly powered self-replications, and then explore the gen-
erality and boundary conditions of the effect in large-sample
crowdsourced PPIR projects. This is a variation of the Explore Small, Con-
ﬁrm Big strategy proposed by Sakaluk (2016).
It may also be useful to consider a Bayesian framework for evaluat-
ing replication results. Instead of forcing a yes-no decision based on sta-
tistical signiﬁcance, in which nonsigniﬁcant results are interpreted as
failures to replicate, a replication Bayes factor allows us to assess the de-
gree to which the evidence supports the original effect or the null hy-
pothesis (Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014).
3.2. Limitations and challenges of pre-publication independent replication
It is important to also consider disadvantages of seeking to indepen-
dently replicate ﬁndings prior to publication. Although more collegial
and collaborative than replications of published ﬁndings (Bohannon,
2014), PPIRs do not speak to the reproducibility of classic andwidely in-
ﬂuential ﬁndings in the ﬁeld, as is the case for instance with the Many
Labs investigations (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014). Rather,
PPIRs can help scholars ensure the validity and reproducibility of their
emerging research streams. The beneﬁt of PPIR is perhaps clearest in
the case of “hot” new ﬁndings celebrated at conferences and likely
headed toward publication in high-proﬁle journals and widespread
media coverage. In these cases, there is enormous beneﬁt to ensuring
the reliability of the work before it becomes common knowledge
among the general public. Correcting unreliable, butwidely disseminat-
ed, ﬁndings post-publication (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, &
Cook, 2012) is much more difﬁcult than systematically replicating
new ﬁndings in independent laboratories before they appear in print
(Schooler, 2014).
Critics have suggested that effect sizes in replications of already pub-
lished work may be biased downward by lack of replicator expertise,
use of replication samples where the original effect would not be theo-
retically expected to emerge (at least without further pre-testing), and
conﬁrmation bias on the part of skeptical replicators (Lieberman,
2014; Schnall, 2014a/b/c; Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Stroebe & Strack,
2014;Wilson, 2014). PPIR explicitly recruits expert partner laboratories
with relevant participant populations and is less subject to these con-
cerns. However, PPIRs could potentially suffer from the reverse prob-
lem, in other words estimated effect sizes that are upwardly biased. In
a PPIR, replicators likely begin with the hope of conﬁrming the original
ﬁndings, especially if they are co-authors on the same research report or
are part of the same social network as the original authors. But at the
same time, the replication analyses are pre-registered, which dramati-
cally reduces researcher degrees of freedom to drop dependent mea-
sures, strategically remove outliers, selectively report studies, and so
forth. The replication datasets are further publicly posted on the inter-
net. It is difﬁcult to see how a replicator could artiﬁcially bias the result
in favor of the original ﬁnding without committing outright fraud. The
incentive to conﬁrm the original ﬁnding in the PPIR may simply lead
replicators to treat the study with the same care and professionalism
that they would their own original work.
The respective strengths andweaknesses of PPIRs and replications of
already published work can effectively balance one another. Initiatives
such as Many Labs and the Reproducibility Project speak to the reliabil-
ity of already well-known and inﬂuential research; PPIRs provide a
check against ﬁndings becoming too well-known and inﬂuential pre-
maturely, before they are established as reliable.
Both existing replication methods (Klein et al., 2014) and PPIRs are
best suited to simple studies that do not require very high levels of ex-
pertise to carry out, such as those in the present Pipeline Project.
Many original ﬁndings suffer from a limited pool of qualiﬁed experts
able and willing to replicate them. In addition, studies that involve sen-
sitivemanipulations can fail even in the hands of experts. For such stud-
ies, the informational value of null effects will generally be lower than
positive effects, since null effects could be either due to an incorrect hy-
pothesis or some aspect of the study not being executed correctly
(Mitchell, 2014). Thus, although replication failures in the Pipeline Pro-
ject have high informational value, not all future PPIRs will be so diag-
nostic of scientiﬁc truth.
Finally, it would be logistically challenging to implement pre-
publication independent replication as a routine method for every
paper in a researcher's pipeline. The number of new original ﬁndings
emerging will invariably outweigh the PPIR opportunities. In practice,
some lower-proﬁle ﬁndings will face difﬁculties attracting replication
laboratories to carry out PPIRs. Researchers may pursue PPIRs for pro-
jects they consider particularly important and likely to be inﬂuential,
or that have policy implications. We discuss potential ways to incentiv-
ize and integrate PPIRs into the current publication system below.
3.3. Implementing and incentivizing PPIRs
Rather than advocate for mandatory independent replication prior
to publication, we suggest that the improved credibility of ﬁndings
that are independently replicatedwill constitute an increasingly impor-
tant quality signal in the coming years. As a ﬁeld we can establish a
premium for research that has been independently replicated prior
to publication through favorable reviews and editorial decisions.
Replicators can either be acknowledged formally as authors (with
their role in the project made explicit in the author contribution state-
ment) or a separate replication report can be submitted and published
alongside the original paper. Research groups can also engage in
“study swaps” in which they replicate each other's ongoing work.
Organizing independent replications across partner universities can
be an arduous and time-consuming endeavor. Researchers with limited
resources need a way to independently conﬁrm the reliability of their
work. To facilitate more widespread implementation of PPIRs, we plan
to create a website where original authors can nominate their ﬁndings
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for PPIRs and post their study materials. Graduate methods classes all
over the world will then adopt these for PPIR projects and the results
will be published as the Pipeline Project 2 with the original researchers
and replicators as co-authors. Additional information obtained from the
replications (such as more precise measures of effect size, narrower
conﬁdence intervals, etc.) can then be incorporated into the ﬁnal pub-
lications by the original authors with the replicators thanked in the ac-
knowledgments. Obviously this approach is best suited to simple
studies that require little expertise, such that a ﬁrst-year graduate stu-
dent can easily run the replications.
For original studies requiring high expertise and/or specialized
equipment, one can envision a large online pool of interested laborato-
ries, with expertise and resources publicly listed. The logic is similar to
that of a temporary internet labor market, in which employers and
workers in different parts of the world post proﬁles and ﬁnd suitable
matches through a bidding process. A similar “collaborator commons”
for open science projects could be used to match original laboratories
seeking to have their work replicated with qualiﬁed experts.2 Leverag-
ing such an approach, even studies that require a great deal of expertise
could be replicated independently prior to publication, so long as a suit-
able partner lab elsewhere in the world can be identiﬁed. TheMany Lab
website for online collaborations recently introduced by the Open Sci-
ence Center (Ebersole, Klein, & Atherton, 2014) already provides the be-
ginnings of such a system.
An onlinemarketplace in which researchers offer up particular ﬁnd-
ings for replication can also help determine the interest and importance
of the ﬁnding. Few will volunteer to help replicate an effect that is not
interesting or novel. Thus a marketplace approach can not only help se-
lect out effects that are not reliable before publication, but also those
that are less likely to capture broad interest from other researchers
who study the same topic.
A challenge for pre-publication independent replication is credit and
authorship. It is standard practice on crowdsourced replication projects
to include replicators as co-authors (e.g., Alogna et al., 2014; Ebersole
et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2014); we know of no ex-
ception to this principle. As with any large-scale collaborative project,
author contributions are typically more limited than a traditional
research publication, but this is proportional to the credit received—
54th author will gain no one an academic position or tenure promotion.
Yet many colleagues still choose to take part, and large crowdsourced
projects with long author strings have become increasingly common
in recent years. This “many authors” approach is critical to the viability
of crowdsourced research as a means to improve the rigor and replica-
bility of our science. However, an extended author string can make it
difﬁcult to distinguish the relative contributions of different project
members. Detailed author contribution statements are critical to clarify-
ing each person's respective project roles.
3.4. Integrating PPIRs and cross-cultural research
Cross-cultural research bears important similaritieswith PPIRs, in that
original studies are repeated in new populations by partner laboratories.
Most research investigations unfortunately do not include cross-cultural
comparisons (Henrich et al., 2010), leaving it an open question whether
the observed phenomenon is similar or different outside the culture in
which the research was originally done. It is worth considering how
PPIRs and cross-cultural research can be better integrated to establish
either the generalizability or cultural boundaries of a phenomenon.
Based on the theorizing underlying the ten effects selected for the
Pipeline project, the original ﬁndings should have replicated consistent-
ly across laboratories. No cultural differences were hypothesized be-
forehand, yet such differences did emerge. For instance, a number of
effects were signiﬁcantly smaller outside of the original culture of the
United States. We suggest that researchers conducting PPIRs include
any anticipated moderation by replication location in their pre-
registration plan (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). This allows for tests
of a priori predictions regarding the cultural variability of a phe-
nomenon. In cases such as ours in which the results point to unan-
ticipated cultural differences, we suggest the investigators follow
up with further conﬁrmatory replications.
More ambitiously, large globally distributed PPIR initiatives could
adopt a replication chain approach to probe the generalizability vs. cul-
tural boundaries of an effect as efﬁciently as possible (see Hüffmeier,
Mazei & Schultze, 2016; and Kahneman, 2012, for complementary per-
spectives on how sequences of replications can inform theory and prac-
tice). In a replication chain, each original effect is ﬁrst replicated in
partner laboratories with subject populations as similar as possible to
the original one. For instance, if a researcher at the University of
Washington believes she has identiﬁed a reliable effect among UW un-
dergraduates, the effect is ﬁrst replicated at the University of Oregon
and then other institutions in the United States. Only ﬁndings that rep-
licate reliably within their original culture would then qualify for inter-
national replications at partner institutions in China, France, Singapore,
and so on. There is little sense in expending limited resources on effects
that do not consistently replicate even in similar subject populations.
Once an effect is established as reliable in its culture of origin, claims
of cross-cultural universality can be put to a rigorous test by deliberately
selecting the available replication sample as different as possible from the
original subject population (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). For instance, if
a researcher at Princeton predicts that she has identiﬁed a universal
judgmental bias, laboratories in non-Western cultures with access to
less educated subject populations should be engaged for the PPIRs. A
successful ﬁeld replication (Maner, 2016) among ﬁshing net weavers
in a rural village in China provides critical evidence of universality; a
successful replication at Harvard adds very little evidence in support
of this particular claim.
Alternatively, crowdsourced PPIR initiatives could coordinate labo-
ratories to systematically test cultural moderators hypothesized a priori
by the original authors (Henrich et al., 2010). Once the ﬁnding is
established as reliable in its original culture, the authors select a speciﬁc
culture or cultures for the replications in which the effect is expected to
be absent or reverse on a priori grounds (e.g., Eastern vs. Western
cultures; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Systematic tests
across multiple universities in each culture then provide a safeguard
against the nonrepresentative samples at each institution, which could
confound comparisons if just one student population from each culture
is used.
4. Conclusion
Pre-Publication Independent Replication is a collaborative approach
to improving research quality in which original authors nominate their
own unpublished ﬁndings and select expert laboratories to replicate
their work. The aim is a replication process free of acrimony and ﬁnal
results high in scientiﬁc truth value. We illustrate the PPIR approach
through crowdsourced replications of the last author's research pipe-
line, revealing the mix of robust, qualiﬁed, and culturally-variable
effects that are to be expected when original studies and replications
are conducted transparently. Integrating pre-publication independent
replication into our research streams holds enormous potential for
building connections between colleagues and increasing the robustness
and reliability of scientiﬁc knowledge, whether in psychology or in
other disciplines.
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